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Abstract
The political determinants of public indebtedness in developing countries is still 
generating a lot of interest among academics and policy makers. This paper 
investigates whether elections influence the public debt dynamics relying on data 
from 51 African countries spanning 1990 to 2015. The analyses are conducted 
using the fixed effects and the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
The results reveal that although all types of elections increase public debt, 
only the impact of the presidential elections are significant. The findings are 
robust irrespective of the estimation technique. The paper recommends African 
countries to rationalize public resources, particularly in the election years.
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1. Introduction
Debt across the world has increased significantly over the past two decades given 
the increasing need for funding in most economies, especially in developing and 
transition economies (Calderón and Zeufack, 2020; Atta-Mensah and Ibrahim, 
2020; Kose et al., 2020; ECA, 2019; Fatás et al., 2019 and AfDB, 2018). Largely 
for this reason, debt issue in Africa is still at the heart of debates in the past few 
decades. For most part, the rising debt is considered as one of the continent's 
main economic challenges (Bayale, 2020a; Calderón and Zeufack, 2020; IMF, 
2019; World Bank, 2019). However, factors underlying the increase in African 
countries’ public debt are inexhaustible. What are the factors that explain public 
debt? Do governments borrow before or during elections years? In fact, the 
economic literature identifies several factors that can influence public debt. 
Among other things, we can mention macroeconomic imbalances, country 
size and the level of development, crises and external shocks, openness and 
exchange rate regime (Fatás et al., 2019; Forslund et al., 2011). Macroeconomic 
imbalances category includes some variables such as GDP growth (Chiminya 
and Nicolaidou, 2015), inflation (Gomez-Gonzalez, 2019; Forslund et al., 2011), 
current account balance (Fatás et al., 2019; Forslund et al., 2011), interest rates 
(Atta-Mensah and Ibrahim, 2020), and employment (Sadik-Zada and Gatto, 
2019). The country size and level of development is related to indicators such as 
GDP per capita (Sadik-Zada and Gatto, 2019), broad money to GDP (Forslund et 
al., 2011) and population (Bohn and Veiga, 2019). Regarding crises and external 
shocks, that category capture the crisis situations related to a sovereign default 
and other impulsive changes in the current macroeconomic situation. Finally, 
the last category sketches trade and capital account openness and the fixed or 
loathing exchange rates. 
Several studies have shown that these economic factors may drive public 
debt. For instance, while providing the trajectory of Africa’s, Atta-Mensah and 
Ibrahim (2020) found that the interest rate-growth differential is the main drivers 
of overall debt dynamics in African economies. By focusing on the motives to 
borrow, Fatás et al. (2019) establish that intertemporal tax-smoothing, fiscal 
stimulus and asset management can explain some of the increases in public 
debt in recent years. Zada and Gatto (2019) investigate into the major drivers 
of the public debt growth in 184 countries. Their findings have shown that oil 
abundance, economic growth rate, the share of mineral rent in the total revenue, 
interest rate payments for foreign borrowings, and being a developing country 
have statistically significant impact on the growth of the public debt, whereas 
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defense spending, unemployment rate, and inflation rate do not have a statistically 
significant positive impact on the public debt rate. According to Chiminya and 
Nicolaidou (2015) who investigate into the determinants of external debt in 
sub-saharan Africa, countries that received debt relief seem to accumulate less 
debt in comparison to those that did not receive debt relief. Their findings also 
highlighted the importance of economic activity in reducing debt in the region. 
Economies that are more opened to international trade reduce their debt burden. 
Forslund et al., (2011) analyzed the determinants of the composition of public 
debt in developing and emerging market countries. Authors have found a weak 
correlation between inflation and the composition of public debt.
Beyond studies mentioned above, Bayale (2020a), Fatás et al. (2019), Bohn 
and Veiga (2019), Potrafke (2018) and Alesina and Passalacqua (2016) suggest 
that even if economic factors can explain some of the increases in public debt 
in recent decades, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. The 
electoral cycles may also generate different incentives to borrow. They can be 
a major cause of overborrowing though budgetary institutions and fiscal rules 
can play a role in mitigating governments’ tendencies to over borrow (Fatás et 
al. 2019). However, a very limited literature has attempted to investigate the 
effect of some socio-political variables on debt (Bayale, 2020a; Sadik-Zada and 
Gatto, 2019; Kaplan and Thomsson, 2017). Indeed, the Africa’s democracy is 
nascent and a key element in a democratic regime is the need for free and fair 
elections. In this endeavour, several countries over the past few decades have 
conducted elections to select political leaders. At the same time, issues around 
Africa’s continent debt continue to grow. However, studies examining whether 
or not elections contribute to the debt dynamics in Africa is dearth. The failure 
of existing studies to re-engage elections-debts dynamics leaves policy makers 
under quandary regarding whether election cycles contribute to debt. Given 
this gap, re-examining the debt dynamics given the continent’s electioneering 
process needs far more nuanced and in-depth analysis. 
In this paper, we examine the effect of all types of elections on public debt. 
Specifically, our aim is to investigate whether elections can explain some of 
the increases observed in African's public debt. Africa presents a fine test case 
because of its democratic experiment. Indeed, right after independence, most 
African countries had dictators governing them and practiced a one-party 
state system (Agoba et al., 2020; Agbloyor, 2019). However, in recent times, 
especially starting from the 1980s and the early 1990s, most African countries 
have made strenuous efforts to improve their democratic credentials (UNDP, 
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2016). It is within this context that we examine how elections influence public 
debt in Africa. 
Our analyses suggest a positive relationship between elections and public 
debt. Among the three types of elections, only the presidential elections have 
a significant effect on public debt accumulation in Africa. The remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview on elections 
events, political regimes and debt in African countries since 1990s. In section 3, 
we present the empirical methods adopted in this paper. We present results from 
our empirical analysis in section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 5 
with key policy implications.
2. Elections, political regimes and debt in Africa: An overview
2.1. Elections and political regimes in African countries
Since the early 1990s, majority of African countries have undergone momentous 
transitions from one-party, military or autocratic rule to multiparty democratic 
systems based on majority rule and popular participation (UNDP, 2016). These 
democratic transitions favored the holding of periodic elections, the foundation 
of most democratic arrangements (Agboyor, 2019). Basing on the National 
Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset which provides 
detailed information on all election events, this study employs elections events 
including three types of elections: presidential, parliamentary and constituent 
assembly elections.
Tables 1 and 2 exhibit the number of elections and the years of elections 
in 51 African countries spanning the period from 1990 to 2015. Data is 
showing that election events between this period amount to 549 including 244 
presidential elections, 299 parliamentary elections and 6 constituent assembly 
elections events. In terms of yearly trends in election events, years where 
which we observe lower number of elections are 1991, 2003 and 2008 with 
12, 10 and 13 elections events, respectively, whereas 1992, 1993, 1996 and 
2011 present higher number of elections with 31, 31, 32 and 37 cumulative 
elections events, respectively (Table 1). In addition, we can observe that most 
countries in Africa run presidential elections concurrently with parliamentary 
elections and/or constituent assembly elections. However, not all countries in 
Africa undertake presidential elections as some countries practice monarchy 
system of presidential elections. If we consider the total number of 549 elections 
events that occurred during the period understudy, 376 elections representing 
68.49% constituted elections where both presidential and parliament elections 
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were run concurrently while 173 elections events representing 31.51% did not 
include presidential and parliament elections events, simultaneously. According 
to NELDA, some countries like Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Libya, Morocco 
and South Africa did not undertake presidential or executive elections. They held 
only parliamentary elections. No election events were mentioned by NELDA in 
Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan in our study period (see Table 2).
taBle 1: summary oF yearly electioN types iN aFrica (1990-2015)
Years Presidential Legislative Const. Assembly Total
1990 5 11 0 16
1991 6 6 0 12
1992 12 18 1 31
1993 14 17 0 31
1994 6 10 3 19
1995 3 12 0 15
1996 21 11 0 32
1997 5 14 0 19
1998 5 9 0 14
1999 12 12 0 24
2000 8 11 0 19
2001 11 9 0 20
2002 8 18 0 26
2003 5 5 0 10
2004 9 12 0 21
2005 12 9 0 21
2006 13 8 0 21
2007 8 19 0 27
2008 5 8 0 13
2009 11 9 0 20
2010 11 8 0 19
2011 19 17 1 37
2012 7 11 0 18
2013 6 13 0 19
2014 10 11 1 22
2015 12 11 0 23
Total 244 299 6 549
Source: Authors’ own construction based on the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) database
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It is imperative to note that, in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Libya and Morocco as well 
as Eritrea, the legislature votes into power the prime minister who exercises the 
executive powers of government, with some specifics. For instance, elections 
in Eritrea select representatives from the country’s six regions for the National 
Assembly. Lesotho as well holds elections for their parliamentary seats and not 
the presidential. Libya holds national elections through a hierarchy of people’s 
committees and then, the general people’s congress elects the head of the 
government. 
taBle 2: speciFic couNtry-level electioNs types eveNts aNd their diFFereNt years    
oF occurreNce, 1990-2015
N Country No. of elections Presidential / Executive Legislative / Parliamentary Constituent Assembly
1 Algeria 10 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
1991, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2012
2 Angola 4 1992 1992, 2008, 2012
3 Benin 18 1991(2), 1996(2), 
2001(2), 2006(2), 2011
1991, 1995(2), 1999, 2002, 
2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
4 Botswana 5 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
5 Burkina Faso 11 1991, 1998, 2005, 2010, 
2015
1992, 1997(2), 2007, 2012, 
2015
6 Burundi 7 1993, 2010, 2015 1993, 2005, 2010, 2015
7 Cameroon 10 1992, 1997, 2004, 2011 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2013(2)
8 Cabo Verde 13 1991, 1996, 2001(2), 
2006, 2011(2)
1991, 1995, 2001, 2006(2), 
2011
9 Central 
African Rep.
18 1992, 1993(2), 1999, 
2005(2), 2011, 2015
1992, 1993(2), 1998(2), 
2005(2), 2011(2), 2015
10 Chad 10 1996(2), 2001, 2006, 
2011
1990, 1997(2), 2002, 2011
11 Comoros 18 1990, 1996(2), 2002, 
2006, 2010
1990, 1992(2), 1993(2), 
1996, 2004(2), 2009(2), 
2015(2)
12 Dem. Rep. of 
Congo
5 2006(2), 2011 2006, 2011
13 Congo 14 1992(2), 2002, 2009 1992(2), 1993(2), 2002 (2), 
2007(2), 2012(2)
14 Côte d’Ivoire 11 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2010(2), 2015
1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 
2011
15 Djibouti 11 1993, 1999, 2005, 2011 1990(2), 1992, 1997, 2003, 
2008, 2013
16 Egypt 18 1993, 1999, 2005, 
2012(2), 2014
1995(2), 2000(3), 2005, 
2007, 2010(2), 2011(2), 
2015
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17 Equatorial 
Guinea
8 1996, 2002, 2009 1993, 1999, 2004, 2008, 
2013
18 Eswatini 6 1993, 2003 1993, 1998, 2008, 2013
19 Ethiopia 7 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 
2015
1994(2)
20 Gabon 13 1993, 1998, 2005, 2009 1990(3), 1996, 2001(2), 
2006(2), 2011
21 Gambia 10 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 
2011
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2012
22 Ghana 14 1992, 1996, 2000(2), 
2004, 2008(2), 2012
1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2012
23 Guinea 9 1993, 1998, 2003, 
2010(2), 2015
1995, 2002, 2013
24 Guinea-
Bissau
16 1994(2), 1999, 2000, 
2005(2), 2009(2), 2012, 
2014(2)
1994, 1999, 2004, 2008, 
2014
25 Kenya 10 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2013
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2013
26 Lesotho 5 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 
2012
27 Liberia 9 1997, 2005(2), 2011(2) 1997, 2005, 2011, 2014
28 Libya 3 2012, 2014 2014
29 Madagascar 13 1992, 1993, 1996(2), 
2001, 2006, 2013(2)
1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 
2013
30 Malawi 10 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
31 Mali 18 1992(2), 1997, 2002(2), 
2007, 2013(2)
1992(2), 1997(3), 2002(2), 
2007(2), 2013
32 Mauritania 16 1992, 1997, 2003, 
2007(2), 2009, 2014
1992(2), 1996(2), 2001(2), 
2006(2), 2013
33 Mauritius 6 1991 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 
2014
34 Morocco 5 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2011
35 Mozambique 10 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
36 Namibia 10 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
37 Niger 17 1993(2), 1996(2), 
1999(2), 2004(2), 
2011(2)
1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 
2004, 2009, 2011
38 Nigeria 13 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007, 
2011, 2015
1992, 1998, 1999, 2003, 
2007, 2011, 2015
39 Rwanda 5 2003, 2010 2003, 2008, 2013
40 São Tomé and 
Prínc.
14 1991, 1996(2), 2001, 
2006, 2011(2)
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 
2006, 2010, 2014
41 Senegal 11 1993, 2000(2), 2007, 
2012(2)
1993, 1998, 2001, 2007, 
2012
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42 Seychelles 13 1993, 1998, 2001, 2006, 
2011, 2015(2)
1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 
2011
1992
43 Sierra Leone 10 1996(2), 2002, 2007(2), 
2012
1996, 2002, 2007, 2012
44 South Africa 5 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
45 Sudan 8 1996, 2000, 2010, 2015 1996, 2000, 2010, 2015
46 Tanzania 13 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010, 2015
1990, 1995, 2000(2), 2005, 
2010, 2015
47 Togo 14 1993, 1998, 2003, 2005, 
2010, 2015
1990(2), 1994(2), 1999, 
2002, 2007, 2013
48 Tunisia 12 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014(2)
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014
2011
49 Uganda 9 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 1994
50 Zambia 12 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 
2008, 2011, 2015
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 
2011
51 Zimbabwe 12 1990, 1996, 2002, 
2008(2), 2013
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2008, 2013
Total 549 244 299 6
Source: Authors’ own construction based on the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) database
Note: The numbers in parentheses (2/3) indicate the number of rounds that the elections took 
place.
Morocco is run on Monarchy. There is a king. The King of Morocco chooses a 
President, just like a prime minister in other jurisdictions, from the largest party 
elected to parliament. The Constitution of Morocco grants executive powers to 
the government. In Botswana and South Africa's electoral system, Presidents 
are subsequently elected by members of the National Assembly following 
general elections. When we analyze the data at country level, Table 2 show that 
in Africa, eight countries including Benin, Central African Republic, Comoros, 
Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Niger record the highest number of 
election events of sixteen each at least (Table 2).
2.2. Overview of Africa’s debt
The debate on debt is increasingly gaining traction especially among donors, 
multilateral banks and policymakers following the rise in the debt of African 
countries in recent years (Atta-Mensah and Ibrahim, 2020). The sharp rise in 
debt reminds us of the debt crisis of the 1990s when the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) was adopted for the outright forgiveness of debt owed by a 
group of 36 low-income poor countries (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019). The 
MDRI was conditioned on sound economic management and poverty reduction 
strategies as well as assist countries to achieve the then Millennium Development 
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Goals (MDGs). Prominent of the debt relief was the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative instituted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank in 1996 to address debt overhang in the poorest countries of the 
world (IMF, 2019). Following this initiative, 29 African countries were among 
the low-income countries to benefit from this debt relief (Atta-Mensah and 
Ibrahim, 2020). 
Figure 1: deBt-to-gdp ratios oF aFricaN couNtries, From 1990-2018 
Source: Authors’ own construction, based on World bank data
To get an idea about the level of debt in African countries over the past 
few decades, we presented Figure 1, which exhibits debt-to-GDP ratios of 51 
African countries from the period spanning from 1990 to 2018. It can be seen 
that Africa’s debt as a share of GDP stood at 67.29% which is higher than the 
55% debt-to-GDP ratio suggested by the IMF. It is even slightly above the 
debt benchmark ratio of 60% of GDP prescribed by the African Monetary 
Cooperation Programme (AMCP). At the country level, the figure (Figure1) 
shows the countries with a low debt ratio are: Zimbabwe, Algeria, Uganda, 
Ghana, Chad, South Africa, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, 
Djibouti, Nigeria, Benin, Namibia, Eswatini and Botswana. In these countries’ 
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debt-to-GDP level is less than 50%. Furthermore, with the exception of Liberia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, all Member-
States of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) registered 
debt-to-GDP ratios far less than the convergence requirement of 70%. Figure 
1 shows that Eritrea, São Tomé and Principe, Sudan, Seychelles, Cabo Verde, 
Burundi, Egypt, Mauritania and Madagascar have debt-to-GDP ratios over 80% 
which are very high, pushing them potentially into high risk of debt distress.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Data and preliminary finding
In this study, we construct a panel dataset of 51 African countries covering 
the period 1990–2015. The choice of these countries is based entirely on data 
availability for a sufficiently longer time period (the list of countries is presented 
in Figure 1 and Table 2). The data starts from 1990 mainly because most African 
countries embarked on their democratic dispensation from the 1990s (UNDP, 
2016). The dataset is limited to 2015 because data on elections after 2015 are not 
available. We use the annual data sources from three different datasets. The first 
one is the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset 
that provides detailed information on all election events (Hyde and Marinov, 
2019). To be included, elections must be for a national executive figure, such as 
a president, or for a national legislative body, such as a parliament, legislature, 
constituent assembly, or other directly elected representative bodies. The second 
dataset is the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. Relying 
on the literature review (Forslund et al., 2011; Potrafke, 2018; Agbloyor, 2019 
and Gomez-Gonzalez, 2019; Bayale, 2020a), we extracted from this dataset 
public debt and some explanatory variables including budget balance, inflation, 
real interest rate, GDP growth rate, investment, trade openness, natural resources 
rents, broad money supply (M2), reserves to total debt and population growth. 
And the third database is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset 
that focuses on political risk and its components. Following Potrafke (2018), 
Sadik-Zada and Gatto (2019) and Bayale (2020a), indices we used from in this 
dataset are government stability and corruption (see Table 3).
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taBle 3: summary oF data sources oF variaBles used iN the model 
N° Variables Description Sources
1 PRESID Presidential elections events (n) NELDA dataset
2 LEGIS Legislative elections events (n) NELDA dataset
3 ASSEM Constituent Assembly elections events (n) NELDA dataset
4 DEBT Public debt (% of GDP) WDI database
5 BUD_BAL Budget balance (% of GDP) WDI database
6 INFL Inflation (%) WDI database
7 INT_R Real interest rate (%) WDI database
8 GDPG Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (%) WDI database
9 INV Investment (% of GDP) WDI database
10 OPEN Trade openness (%) Computed, WDI
11 NAT_RESS Natural resources rents (% of GDP) WDI database
12 M2 Broad money supply (% of GDP) WDI database
13 RES_TDEBT International reserves to total debt WDI database
14 POP_R Population growth (%) WDI database
15 GOV_STAB Government Stability index ICRG data
16 CORR Corruption index ICRG data
Source: Authors’ own construction based on the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) database
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 below. We can notice that 
the present study relates to a non-balanced panel where certain variables such 
as inflation, government stability and corruption, present missing data for 
certain countries. The mean of public debt is about 66.46% of GDP over the 
sample period. This amount suggests that debt has been an important source 
of development finance for African countries. Compared to the mean of public 
investment which represents only 22.06% of GDP, the debt in African countries 
has exceeded the threshold of 50% of GDP (Drakes et al., 2012; IMF, 2019). 
So, the debt situation in Africa seems to be remarkable to the point that in 
April 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was saying that the half 
of African Low-Income Countries (LICs) are either in debt distress or at high 
risk of being so (IMF, 2019). Regarding elections events, they exhibit that the 
mean of elections was 0.16 (16%) for presidential elections, 0.19 (19%) for 
legislative elections and 0.003 (0.3%) for constituent assembly elections. This 
suggests that presidential and legislative elections each took place in almost 
1/5th of the years of our study sample. As for the constituent elections, they 
are rare in this sample. Thus, presidential and legislative elections were held 
33
Bayale et al: More elections, more burden? On the relationship between elections and public 
debt in Africa
in one of about every five or so years for the African countries. The budget 
balance represents on average more than 4% of GDP. This reflects a financing 
need that external resources such as debt would help to meet. Equatorial Guinea 
recorded the highest observation for budget balance and Sao Tome and Principe 
records the lowest. Inflation recorded a mean of 13.41%. This suggests that 
African countries have experienced high levels of macroeconomic imbalances. 
Zimbabwe recorded the highest inflation levels. Natural resources rents recorded 
a mean of 12.47% of GDP. Equatorial Guinea and Mauritius recorded the highest 
and lowest observation for natural resources rents, respectively.
Regarding the trade openness, this variable recorded a mean of about 40.94%. 
This suggests that African countries is open to trade within the continent as well 
as other continents countries. Also, Africa's international reserves to total debt 
recorded a mean of 94.87. Algeria and Liberia recorded the highest and lowest 
observation for reserves to total debt, respectively. Population growth recorded 
a mean of about 2.43%, suggesting that Africa has a high population growth 
rate. Regarding institutional variables, government stability recorded a mean 
of 2.15 of 12 whereas corruption recorded a mean of 0.95 of 6. These scores 
suggest high risk of government stability and corruption in Africa.
The correlation results are presented in Table 5. The correlations show 
a positive association between public debt and each type of election albeit 
weakness given the low size of the correlation coefficient. There is a negative 
correlation between budget balance and debt. We find also, negative correlation 
between real interest rate and debt. Natural resources rents and reserves to total 
debt are also correlated to debt negatively, whereas inflation, GDP growth and 
Investment are correlated to debt positively. Budget balance, investment, trade 
openness, natural resources rents and reserves to total debt are correlated to 
elections events negatively. There is a negative correlation between public debt 
and each two institutional quality indicators. Elections events are also positively 
associated to government stability and corruption. This suggest that the more 
elections took place, the more institutional quality is better.
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taBle 4: summary statistics
Variables Observation Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Presidential 
elections
1,326 0.156 0.363 0 1
Legislative 
elections
1,326 0.187 0.391 0 1
Constituent 
Assembly 
elections
1,326 0.003 0.061 0 1
Public debt 1,301 66.468 59.926 0.488 547.727
Budget 
balance
1,160 -4.052 29.883 -662.416 124.112
Inflation 857 13.411 36.607 -29.205 598.7
Real interest 
rate
1,239 2.089 1.970 0 31.608
GDP growth 1,319 4.182 8.837 -61.4 149.973
Investment 1,291 22.064 15.876 -2.424 219.069
Trade 
openness
1,301 40.937 38.492 3.571 380.430
Natural 
resources rents
1,301 12.474 12.626 0.001 84.239
Money M2 1,221 18.408 25.546 -67.339 574.91
Reserves to 
total debt
1,279 94.869 330.674 0.01 3717.649
Population 
growth
1,326 2.435 1.095 -6.542 8.457
Government 
Stability
936 7.885 2.151 1 11.583
Corruption 936 2.311 0.955 0 5
Source: Authors’ own construction based on the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) database
From the foregoing, the correlation matrix generally is insufficient to fully 
appreciate the quality of the relationships between the variables described, 
because correlations only show the relationship between the two variables 
without controlling for the effect of the other variables. Therefore, we perform 
econometric analysis by discussing our empirical strategy below.
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taBle 5: summary statistics 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Presidential 
elections (1)
1.000
Legislative 
elections (2)
0.051 1.000
Constituent Ass. 
elections (3)
0.037 0.043 1.000
Public debt (4) 0.061 0.026 0.044 1.000
Budget balance 
(5)
-0.081 -0.071 -0.210 -0.161 1.000
Inflation (6) -0.002 -0.036 0.037 0.154 -0.178 1.000
Real interest 
rate (7)
-0.123 -0.045 0.028 -0.223 0.158 -0.102 1.000
GDP growth (8) 0.005 0.049 -0.121 0.066 0.328 -0.007 -0.055 1.000
Investment (9) -0.063 -0.042 -0.052 0.149 0.007 -0.051 0.027 0.076 1.000
Trade openness 
(10)
-0.055 -0.028 -0.017 -0.07 0.235 -0.104 0.254 0.029 0.185 1.000
Natural 
resources rents 
(11)
-0.036 -0.007 0.057 -0.047 0.302 0.090 0.113 0.070 0.019 0.342 1.000
Money M2 (12) 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.072 0.035 0.004 -0.108 0.142 -0.051 0.024 0.213 1.000
Reserves to total 
debt (13)
-0.059 -0.017 0.047 -0.338 0.045 -0.062 0.169 -0.060 0.114 0.235 0.258 -0.021 1.000
Population 
growth (14)
0.068 -0.031 -0.052 0.117 0.079 0.118 -0.374 0.101 0.073 -0.154 0.144 0.166 -0.276 1.000
Government 
Stability (15)
-0.062 -0.003 -0.101 0.035 0.274 -0.125 0.066 0.073 0.174 0.094 0.118 0.055 0.031 -0.079 1.000
Corruption (16) -0.054 -0.033 -0.007 0.091 -0.002 0.002 0.082 -0.087 0.164 0.049 -0.303 -0.071 -0.011 -0.031 0.622 1.000
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Note: Three types of elections events are taken into account to this study, based on the NELDA 
dataset: Presidential elections events, Legislative elections events and Constituency Assembly 
elections events. Each electoral event is dummy variable taking on a value of 1 in a year of 
elections and zero otherwise. Public debt is the total debt owed by government to domestic 
residents, foreign nationals and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. Budget balance is the Government receipts minus government outlays, 
as a percentage of GDP. Inflation is the consumer price index. Real interest rate is the interest 
payments made on medium- and long-term debt in current year. GDP growth is growth in GDP. 
Investment is the gross fixed investment expenditure at current market prices, as a percentage 
of GDP. Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. Natural resources 
rents are divided by GDP. Money M2 is money supply divided by GDP. Reserves to total debt is 
total international reserves as a percentage of total external debt stock. Population growth is the 
growth in population. Government Stability and Corruption are institutional variables extracted 
from ICRG. 
3.2. Model specification and empirical strategy
3.2.1. Model specification
In this section, we present the following equation that examining the effect of 
the types of elections on public debt:
with elections defined as followed:
and the composite error term ε
i,t
 = v
i 
+ η
i,t
The dependent variable in this model is public debt. This is measured as the 
total debt owed by government to domestic residents, foreign nationals and 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The 
elections types variables were obtained from NELDA dataset which indicate 
when and what type of elections were held in a particular country (Hyde and 
Marinov, 2019). These elections variable was constructed as a dummy, with a 
value of 1 in election years and 0 otherwise. β
i
 represents the coefficients of 
different types of elections. The vector X
i,t
 contains a list of control variables 
which are obtained based on the standard literature. These include budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP; inflation measured by the consumer price index 
(Gomez-Gonzalez, 2019); real interest rate and GDP growth (Bohn and Veiga, 
2019); investment as a percentage of GDP (Sadik-Zada and Gatto, 2019); trade 
(1)
(2)
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openness is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP; natural resources 
rents are divided by GDP (Forslund et al., 2011); broad money supply (M2), 
divided by GDP; total international reserves as a percentage of total external 
debt stock and population growth (Sadik-Zada and Gatto, 2019; Potrafke, 
2019). This variable contains institutional variables: government stability and 
corruption are institutional variables extract from International Country Risk 
Guide (Potrafke, 2019; Bohn and Veiga, 2019; Agbloyor, 2019).
In terms of sign expectations of explanatory variables, not exhaustively, we 
expect a positive relationship between elections events and public debt. Bohn 
and Veiga (2019) finds a positive relationship between elections events and 
public debt in Portugal. We expect a positive relationship between debt and 
budget balance. We expect a negative relationship between trade openness 
and public debt because the more you trade, the less the country need debt 
(Forslund et al., 2011). We expect either a positive or negative relationship 
between natural resources rents. For instance, a positive relationship suggests 
that natural resources attract debt in African countries. Also, we expect the 
positive relationship between investments and debt because, in many African 
countries, debt is may be used for investment. A negative relationship between 
inflation and public debt is expected (Gomez-Gonzalez, 2019).
3.2.2. Empirical strategy
This study seeks to answer whether the elections events contribute to public 
debt accumulation in African countries. In other words, if the elections events 
constitute a determinant of public debt. The argument made is that, due to 
the high cost engendered by the elections events, governing parties contract 
loans either to finance directly the electoral operations, or to undertake public 
investments (the policy of the large structuring building sites) intended to 
influence the voters in their favor as they expect to be re-elected. The assumption 
is that, these incentives to go into debt are higher during the pre-electoral and 
electoral years compared to the non-electoral years. If this assumption is true, 
then the magnitude of the effect of electoral events on the accumulation of 
public debt should be greater during the pre-electoral and electoral years than 
during the non-electoral years. Knowing that, our empirical results based on the 
estimation of equation (1) would be consistent across two types of estimation 
procedures. We first employ a fixed effects model to address unit heterogeneity 
(Wooldridge, 2019; 2016), given the expected country-specific differences in 
the time-series cross-sectional data. Moreover, the results of a Hausman test 
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also favour a fixed effect over a random effects specification, rejecting the null 
hypothesis X2
(15)
=36.58, corresponding to a probability of 0.0015, that both 
methods of estimation are very consistent.
However, a potential problem with the fixed effects specification is that this 
approach does not take into account for potential bias of endogeneity. This 
problem paramount in panel data where the time T is quite small. In social 
science data sets like ours with a T ≥ 20, scholars have found that the potential 
bias from using a fixed effects estimator in these regressions is likely to be quite 
small (Wilson and Butler, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2017). We therefore resolve these 
problems relying on the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation approach (Arellano and Bond 1991; Roodman, 2009) where we can 
estimate using the first difference or system GMM after introduction of the lag 
of the public debt. Since v
i
 may be correlated with other regressors, we can first 
difference to eliminate the country-specific effect. However, this approach has 
very poor finite properties both in terms of bias and precision, especially when 
the explanatory variables are persistent over time as their lagged values tend to 
be weak instruments and predictors of endogenous changes (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). In that case, the appropriate technique capable of yielding consistent 
and unbiased estimates is the system GMM which rests on the combination 
of the system regression in differences with the regression in levels (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In that process, two tests will be 
important: the serial correlation test which examines the null hypothesis that the 
error term is serially uncorrelated and the Sargan’s test examines the exogeneity 
of the instruments. At the same time, the system GMM results will be used for 
robustness checks.
4. Main results and discussion
4.1. Baseline results
We present our results using both fixed effects and GMM estimators. In Table 
6, we present the fixed effects results that estimate the effect of elections on 
public debt. Five equations are estimated. The equation (I) is where the level 
public debt is explained only by presidential elections, legislative elections and 
constituent assembly elections. The equation (II) takes into account variables 
of interest and corruption. The equation (III) resumes the second equation by 
replacing corruption by government stability because there is a high correlation 
these two institutional variables (Table 5). The equation (IV) take back the 
second one by adding some economic variable, vice versa for the equation (V). 
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taBle 6: BaseliNe results: Fixed eFFects (Fe) estimatioNs
[I] [II] [III] [IV] [V]
CONS
 
6.644*
(0.079)
4.666*
(0.082)
5.6851*
(0.074)
10.085
(0.541)
10.116
(0.492)
PRESID
 
0.360*
(0.062)
0.471*
(0.085)
0.478*
(0.081)
0.319*
(0.075)
0.289*
(0.058)
LEGIS
 
0.355
(0.421)
0.352
(0.473)
0.386
(0.434)
0.472
(0.899)
0.565
(0.882)
ASSEM
 
0.027
(0.256)
0.028
0.219)
0.028
(0.213)
0.013
(0.391)
0.015
(0.327)
BUD_BAL
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0.255**
(0.030
-0.380**
0.014
INFL
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0.282***
(0.004)
-0.3501***
(0.001)
INT_R
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-1.034
(0.324)
-0.776
(0.470)
GDPG
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-.0793
(0.711)
-0.101
(0.648)
INV
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
2.002***
(0.000)
1.896***
(0.000)
OPEN
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.391***
(0.005)
0.3192**
(0.027)
NAT_RESS
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-1.188***
(0.000)
-1.04***
(0.000)
M2
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.070
(0.495)
0.066
(0.539)
RES_TDEBT
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0.006
(0.112)
-0.009
(0.027)
POP_R
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.255*
(0.074)
0.548
(0.210)
CORR_COT
 
-
-
-0.699**
(0.006)
-
-
-1.359***
(0.000)
-
-
GOV_STAB
 
-
-
-
-
-0.665
(0.514)
-
-
-1.142
(0.206)
R2 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.67 0.63
Prob. Fisher (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326
No. of 
Countries
51 51 51 51 51
Note: *, ** and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
According to the reported results, there is a positive relationship between 
elections and public debt accumulation. Given the positive effect, our evidence 
suggests that, relative to pre-election period, there is about 36% probability 
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that presidential election periods are characterized by higher debt. While 
the coefficients of the legislative and constituent assembly elections are also 
positive, none of them statistically significant at conventional levels. This 
finding holds even after including control of corruption in the regression (see 
II). Anecdotally, in democratic governments, there tend to be uncertainty in 
terms of re-election and hence they tend to please the electorates by spending on 
social capital, health and education in order to be voted leading to accumulation 
of more debt in the process than autocratic regimes that may not need to be 
voted into power. On the effects of the elections on public debt, our results 
seem to corroborate with the findings of Bohn and Veiga (2019) who analyzed 
the relationship between elections, recession expectations and excessive debt 
in Portuguese municipalities. The authors found that policymakers expecting 
a recession during an election year allow the primary deficit to increase even 
more when the stock of debt is very high. Also, Agoba et al. (2020) investigated 
if the behavior and effectiveness of Central bank independence (CBI) on fiscal 
policy varies between non-election and election years. Authors have examined 
whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced 
by higher institutional quality by using recent CBI data on 48 African countries, 
90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries.
Agoba et al., (2020) observed that, in Africa, the magnitudes of the CBI 
coefficients are smaller in election years than in nonelection years. This means 
that the impact of CBI on reducing net central bank claims on government is lower 
in election years than in non-election years, though not significantly (Agoba 
et al., 2020). When examining the relation between foreign direct investment 
(FDI), elections and welfare in Africa, Agbloyor (2019) did not find a significant 
relationship between elections and FDI flows. This means that elections play 
no significant role in influencing FDI flows. In contrary to Agbloyor’s (2019) 
results, Julio and Yook (2016) found a negative relationship between elections 
and FDI in 44 countries. For Frantz (2019) and Goldsmith (2019) who analyzed 
the effects of elections on capital flight in Africa, basing on the assumption 
that elections follows an electoral cycle, the authors found that capital flight is 
higher during election years compared to other times.
Thus, the evidence reveals that in our case, only the presidential elections 
matter for the debt dynamics in Africa given the insignificance of the other 
types of elections. Probably because, legislative and constituent assembly 
elections mobilize far fewer public resources than presidential elections. This 
does not mean that African countries must slow down their progress towards 
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the democratic process by limiting the number of elections. Instead, countries 
should rather rationalize public resources, particularly before and during the 
electoral years in a way that limits waste of resources (Bayale, 2020b; Bayale, 
2019).
Turning to the control variables, the Table 6 shows a negative and significant 
relationship between budget balance and public debt. As most of African States 
accumulate budget deficits, our results suggest that African countries are obliged 
to borrow in order to finance their deficit. The result is then an accumulation 
of public debt. We also found a negative and significant relationship between 
inflation and public debt. Inflation had a negative relationship with public debt. 
This suggests that macroeconomic instability discourages loans flows because 
of the increased uncertainties (Agbloyor, 2019). On the inflation-linked public 
debt in emerging economies during crises, Gomez-Gonzalez (2019) reported a 
set of stylized facts about inflation-linked public debt in emerging economies. 
The study found evidence of inflation-linked rates decreasing in about half of 
the most recent crises in emerging economies. Investment and trade openness 
have a positive effect on public debt. Indeed, the results suggest that more open 
economies are likely to have high debt levels compared with those who are 
less open to trade, as the coefficient of that variable is positive and significant 
(Sadik-Zada and Gatto, 2019, Bayale, 2020a). This is consistent with Forslund 
et al. (2011) who found the effect of openness to be positively related to external 
debt in a group of middle-income countries. We find that natural resources 
have a negative effect on public debt in Africa. This suggests that countries 
endowed with natural resources tend to not receive more loans. By focusing on 
the determinants of the public debt and the role of the natural resources in 184 
countries, Sadik-Zada and Gatto (2019) found a negative relationship between 
oil rent as a share in total public revenue and the public debt. According to their 
results, an increase of the oil revenues by 1% leads to a decrease of the public 
debt by 1.96% (Sadik-Zada and Gatto, 2019). Moreover, we find that reducing 
corruption reduces public debt significantly (Potrafke, 2018). This suggest that 
an uncorrupted government favors a better domestic resources mobilization 
as well as their better channel towards productive investments. Regarding 
non-significant variables, Table 6 show that interest rate, GDP growth rate, 
international reserves to total debt, population growth and government stability 
have negative coefficients wile broad money supply have positive coefficients.
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4.2. Robustness check
In the robustness analysis, we control for the endogeneity through our usage of 
the system GMM. Table 7 presents the findings of GMM estimations. 
taBle 7: roBustNess check: system gmm estimatioN results
[I] [II] [III] [IV] [V]
CONS
 
4.968*
(0.082)
2.902
(0.103)
8.590
(0.221)
1.96564
(0.378)
1.6252
(0.771)
DEBT_1
 
0.884***
(0.000)
0.865***
(0.000)
0.874***
(0.000)
0.849***
(0.000)
0.874***
(0.000)
PRESID 0.373*
(0.056)
0.3201*
(0.069)
0.281*
(0.077)
0.138*
(0.084)
0.190*
(0.092)
LEGIS 0.161
(0.112)
0.191
(0.247)
0.208
(0.366)
0.121
(0.204)
0.633
(0.433)
ASSEM 0.016*
(0.081)
0.027
(0.069)
0.017
(0.053)
0.044
(0.373)
0.073
(0.336)
BUD_BAL -
-
-
-
-
-
-0.140**
(0.025)
-0.205**
(0.026)
INFL -
-
-
-
-
-
-0.151**
(0.025)
-0.119*
(0.099)
INT_R -
-
-
-
-
-
-0.256
0.758)
-1.131
(0.137)
GDPG -
-
-
-
-
-
0.123
(0.362)
0.152
(0.327)
INV -
-
-
-
-
-
0.523
(0.198)
0.523
(0.193)
OPEN -
-
-
-
-
-
0.187**
(0.027)
0.169**
(0.034)
NAT_RESS -
-
-
-
-
-
-0.058*
(0.036)
-0.091*
(0.042)
M2 -
-
-
-
-
-
0.025
(0.507)
0.015
(0.734)
RES_TDEBT -
-
-
-
-
-
-0.021
(0.322)
0.001
(0.538)
POP_R -
-
-
-
-
-
0.841
(0.538)
0.433
(0.359)
CORR_COT -
-
-0.996***
(0.001)
-
-
-2.086**
(0.016)
-
-
GOV_STAB -
-
-
-
-0.477*
(0.074)
-
-
-1.631
(0.269)
Observation
Nb. of countries
Nb. of instruments
AR (1)
AR (2)
Hansen test
1326
51
29
(0.000)
(0.379)
(0.769)
1326
51
34
(0.004)
(0.631)
(0.132)
1326
51
34
(0.005)
(0.611)
(0.108)
1326
51
47
(0.000)
(0.247)
(0.752)
1326
51
47
(0.000)
(0.562)
(0.745)
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Note: *, ** and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.*, ** and *** 
respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. AR (1) and AR (2) respectively represent 
the first and second order serial correlation.
The bottom part of the table shows the Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions tests the overall validity of the instruments and failure to reject the 
null hypothesis gives support for the model, including our choice of endogenous 
variables. The Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences tests whether the 
residuals from the regression in differences is second order serially correlated. 
The model adequacy is apt based on all the diagnostic tests. We take account 
of persistence of the stock of public debt by including the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor. We can notice that its coefficient is positive, significant 
and stable whatever the equation (I to V). When we compare results presented in 
Table 7 with those obtained using fixed effects approach (Table 6), specifically 
regarding our variables of interest, the results are consistent and qualitatively 
similar to those obtained earlier. There is a positive relationship between 
elections and public debt and only significant with presidential elections. 
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we use data is obtained from the National Elections across 
Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset and the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank over a period spanning from 1990 to 2015 to 
analyze whether elections events influence the public debt dynamic in 51 African 
countries. We start by positioning our study compared to the existing economic 
literature. We also presented an overview on elections, political regimes and debt 
in African countries. We exhibited data sources and some preliminary statistical 
analysis related to the relationship between political institutions in public debt 
accumulation. After that, we then applied fixed effects approach to achieve the 
objective of the study. While the approach used for analysis was satisfactory, the 
system generalized method of moments (GMM) that provided other estimates 
were consistent with the initial findings. 
The empirical findings support the fact that, there is a positive relationship 
between elections and public debt. However, that relationship is only significant 
for the impact of presidential elections. While the coefficients of the other 
legislative and constituent assembly elections are positively relative to debt, 
their statistical impact is benign. Indeed, these findings hold regardless of the 
estimated equation and the estimation approach applied.
This result implies that improving and diversifying the method of financing 
of the political regimes as well as strengthening institutions, accountability and 
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economic governance by governments is critical in managing and controlling the 
level of indebtedness for debt sustainability in Africa. This paper can therefore 
be thought of a shift from the standard paradigm linking political factors in the 
accumulation of debt in Africa.
Future research might take into account further research questions arising 
from this study. Upcoming research should not ignore the effect of political 
factors on debt accumulation in Africa by Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), specific countries and by political regime types (democratic regimes 
and autocratic regimes), in order to allow comparisons to be made.
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